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The rule that, absent a waiver, "no person may be imprisoned. . . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial"108 could

apply to the military without undue disruption of its functions. In
reaching a contrary conclusion, the Middendorf Court over-estimated
the needs of the military and under-estimated the needs of the individual.
MARK

A. STERNLICHT

Mortgages-Use of Due on Sale Clause by a Lender Is Not a
Restraint on Alienation in North Carolina
During the last seven centuries of judicial history, courts have construed restraints on alienation to be contrary to public policy and therefore void.1 The North Carolina Supreme Court has followed this tradition by consistently holding that conditions that restrain the alienation
of legal 2 and equitable3 estates are void. In Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,' however, the court altered its position. In departing from the traditional restraints on alienation doctrine,
the court developed a new test and sustained the use of a due on sale
clause' as a valid restraint on alienation. 6 This result was reached de102. Note, Military Law--Courts-Martial-Recent Cases Defining the Right to
Counsel Before Summary Courts-Martial,1975 B.Y.U.L. l~v. 285, 292-93.
103. 407 U.S.at 37.
1. The Statute of Quia Enptores, 18 Edw. 1, cc. 1-3, was enacted in 1290.
Under this statute the doctrine of subinfeudation was limited by prohibition of feudal
tenures in a fee simple estate. L. Sim.s & A. SMITH, THE LAw OF FuTuRE INTEREsrs § 15 (2d ed. 1956).
This statute laid the basis for many of the common law
doctrines dealing with restraints on alienation.
2. Brooks v. Griffin, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919); Latimer v. Waddell,
119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896).
3. E.g., Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916).
4.

289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).

5. Mortgages that contain a due on sale clause permit the lender to withhold
consent to possible transfers by the mortgagor. A mortgagor who seeks to alienate
his property without the lender's consent faces the possible exercise of the clause by
the lender. An exercise will force acceleration of the existing note and all principal
will be due on the note at the time of sale. The clause used in Crockett reads:
[Or if property herein conveyed is transferred without the written assent of
the Association, then in all or any of said events the full principal sum with
all unpaid interest thereon shall at the option of Association, its successors or
assigns, become at once due and payable without further notice and irrespective
of the date of maturity expressed in said note.
Id. at 622, 224 S.E.2d at 582.
6. Id. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
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spite the fact that the sole reason for the lender's decision to enforce
the due on sale clause, and thus to accelerate the note, was to collect

a higher interest rate.
In April of 1975, plaintiffs, Mrs. Crockett and Mr. and Mrs. Proc-

tor, entered into a contract with defendant Association for the purchase
of three apartment buildings.. The agreement was conditioned on the
Proctors' ability to assume the outstanding balance of the indebtedness

on the buildings at the seven percent rate specified in the note. Defendant Association agreed to accept the assumption agreement provided that the Proctors consented to a new interest rate of nine and threequarters percent. If a transfer were made under any other circumstances,
the Association would accelerate the note. Suit was brought by plaintiffs to restrain enforcement of the clause and for money damages. In
superior court, summary judgment was granted for plaintiffs."

The

supreme court reversed, holding that justifiable reasons exist for enforcing such clauses and that their overall effect on alienation is insignifi-

cant.9 These justifiable reasons are not limited to security impairment
but could include significant economic interests such as raising the
interest rate.' 0
To evaluate the Crockett decision properly, it is necessary to examine prior case law dealing with the restraint on alienation doctrine
and its relationship with the due on sale clause. Courts have taken

three different approaches in analyzing restraints.

The first two ap-

proaches deal with direct restraints on the alienability of property.

The majority doctrine of direct restraints, which is the traditional view,
holds all restraints invalid per se unless the restriction falls within certain recognized exceptions." Under the minority doctrine of direct re7. Crockett had assumed the note when she purchased the apartments from
Domar Corporation, the original debtor, in May of 1968.. The original interest rate
was seven percent. Id. at 635, 636, 224 S.E.2d at 590 (Lake, J., dissenting).
8. Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 75 CVS 5941 (Super. Ct.
of Mecklenburg County, Sept. 24, 1975). The issue of damages was ordered to remain
upon the civil docket. 289 N.C. at 620-21, 224 S.E.2d at 581.
. Id. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587. But see Justice Lake's dissent, in which
he stated that the due on sale clause is as fundamental a restraint as is the classic
promissory restraint. Id. at 644, 224 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting Volkmer, The Application
of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA
L. REV. 747 (1973)).
10. Id. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
11. See, e.g., Wachovia*Bank & Trust Co. v. John Thomasson Constr. Co., 275
N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969) (condition annexed to creation of charitable trust
an exception to restraints doctrine); Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916)
(condition preventing alienation of woman's separate equitable estate held a valid restraint). See also Note, Deeds of Trust-Restraints Against Alienation-Due-On
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straints, a restraint is valid and reasonable when its purpose outweighs

the actual hindrance on the property interest. 12 Under the third view
only restrictions classified as indirect restraints on alienation are sus-

tained as valid.13 The latter two views differ noticeably from the majority direct restraint approach. Under the latter view, the court characterizes the supposed restraint either as an invalid hindrance or as an
exception. This characterization is the extent of the analysis. The
minority direct restraint view and the indirect view use a balancing process to determine whether justifiable purposes exist for the restriction.
Most courts in considering whether the due on sale clause is a restraint
on alienation have sustained the clause under either the minority doctrine of direct restraints or the indirect view."4
Out of this judicial balancing, several social and economic factors
have emerged as salient to the decision whether a due on sale clause
is a valid restriction. Most. factors cited by the courts have involved
security impairment 5 and the economic interests of the lender. These
interests include increased interest rates, 16 reduced lending risk 17 and
increased lending caused by greater turnover of loan funds. 18 In balancing the risk of security impairment against the economic interests
of the lender, courts have developed three divergent views concerning
the due on sale clause.' 9
Clause is -an Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation Absent a Showing of Protection
of Mortgagee'sLegitimate Interests, 47 Miss. L.J. 331 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d
1 (1975); Gale v. York Center Community Coop., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960).
See generally Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on
Alienation, 57 MicH. L. Rav. 1173 (1959).
13. L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, THE LAW OF Furua

INTEREsrs § 1112 (2d ed. 1956).

An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish tome
purpose other than the restraint on alienability, but with the incidental result that
the instrument if valid would restrain practical alienability. Id.
14. See Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1964); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240. (1973).
15. E.g., Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d
725 (1972); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66
Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974).
16. 'E.g., Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804
(Sup. Ct. 1970); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
17. E.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971),
cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1332 (1972); Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
18. This is the ultimate result of use of the due on sale clause. A greater number of loans can be made with adequate protection given by the due on sale clause.
See Note, supranote 11, at 345.
19. Most of the early case law that laid the foundation for the three views came

1977]

DUE ON SALE CLAUSE

In one view, the impairment of security approach, mere allegation
by the lender that the covenants or conditions of the loan have been

violated is not enough to justify acceleration.2 ° "Acceleration can occur
only when the purpose of the clause has been circumvented or the lender's security jeopardized." 21 The courts following this view feel that if
circumvention were not present and the clause were enforced, then the
equitable powers of the court would be invoked to impose an extreme

penalty on the debtor.2 2 This approach is the most restrictive of the
three.

A second view, the reasonable circumstances view, allows the lender to enforce the due on sale clause when his action is reasonable un-

der the circumstances.

Courts using this approach usually balance

the equitable factors involved.2 4 Economic interests of both the borrower and the lender are also balanced under this view. An interesting
development in these cases is that the lender's desire to increase the
interest rate of a note is not an invalid reason per se. 25 By recognizing

both the economic interest of the lender and the individual circumstances of the mortgagor, this approach leads to varied results.
The final view, the per se approach,20 gives the lender the greatest
amount of authority. Under this approach, the lender may enforce the
from the California Supreme Court. The first of these cases was Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), which held that
the due on sale clause was a valid instrument if it served to protect justifiable interests (e.g., property upkeep, integrity and character of purchaser). In Cherry v. Home
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), the court held
that lenders had discretion in the use of their money and no obligation existed to
act reasonably. Later cases began to cut back on this precedent. In La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971),
the court recognized that automatic enforcement of a due on.encumbrance clause was
unnecessary to protect security. Finally in Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n,
12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974), the court severely limited Cherry, supra, by holding that automatic enforcement of a due on sale clause
will no longer be permitted. Legitimate interests must exist before a lender will be
able to exercise the clause.
20. E.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971),
cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972).
21. Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
22. See, e.g., id.
23. See generally Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real PropertySecurity Interests,58 IowA L. REv. 747 (1973).
24. E.g., Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66
Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974).
25. E.g., People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257
N.E.2d 406. (1970); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
26. See, e.g., Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Controversy has centered around whether Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), should be placed in this
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clause for strictly economic reasons, for example: (1) lender can rid
his portfolio of low yield loans and make new agreements at higher
rates; (2) lender can escape arbitrary termination provisions. 27 The
per se approach narrowly construes the due on sale clause in favor of
the lender.28
In Crockett, the North Carolina Supreme Court appears to have
rejected the majority direct restraint on alienation doctrine and moved
into a balancing process. Application of this balancing process involved mixing several restraint on alienation views with the due on sale
approaches: One of the main criteria used was the Restatement of
Property definition of restraints.2 9 Under this definition restraints are
justified by measuring the amount of actual interference with alienation
and comparing this result with the objectives sought by enforcement

of the restraint. If the actual interference with alienability is insignificant, the supposed restraint will be sustained. 0 This objective-versusrestraint approach is similar to the analysis under both the minority
view of direct restraints and the indirect restraint view."' In using a
balancing approach, the court also incorporated the reasonable circumstances view of due on sale clauses used in other jurisdictions. 82 Unlike the courts in these other jurisdictions, however, the North Carolina
court mentioned only a few of the many factors usually involved in due
on sale decisions.
One policy consideration mentioned by the court was the failure
of the lender to use prepayment penalties. 3 By not using the prepayment penalties, the lender allows the mortgagor to refinance with little
difficulty when interest rates drop. Allowing the lender the same abilcategory. Justice Lake in his dissent suggested that Coast Bank did follow the per
se approach. 289 N.C. at 638, 224 S.E.2d at 592. Volkmer, supra note 23, at 77475, suggests that Justice Traynor was trying to write Coast Bank under the reasonable
circumstances view.
27. See Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 867, 313 N.Y.S.2d
804, 808 (1970).
28. See, e.g., id. at 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
29. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 410, Comment a at 2429 (1944).
30. 289 N.C. at 628, 224 S.E.2d at 586.
31. See Bernhard, supra note 12. See generally L. SIMES & A. SMiTH, supra
note 13, at § 1112.
32. 289 N.C. at 628, 224 S.E.2d at 586.
33. Id. at 627, 224 S.E.2d at 585. Prepayment penalties are used by many lenders. If the mortgagor wants to pay the loan off before maturity date, he may have
to pay a certain percentage fee based on the outstanding loan amount or the original
debt. These fees usually run from one to two percent. See Comment, Usury Law
in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. Rnv. 761, 785 (1969). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
24-10 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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ity to adjust the rates seems equitable.34 The stress put on: this factor
by the Crockett court is consistent with precedent in other jurisdictions. 85
Another policy factor3 mentioned by the court was the ability of
plaintiff to alienate her realty absolutely without fear of penalty or forfeiture.8 7 Although the mortgagor has the ability to sell his equity, the

lender's decision to exercise the clause may often be as effective a "deterrent" as the issuance of an injunction barring the sale.3 8

With the

emergence of the interest rate as a component of real estate value,3 9
the decision by the lender to exercise the clause may either reduce the
proceeds of the sale or preclude it entirely.40 Low interest rates and
the ability to assume low interest loans are often major considerations
in buying residential real estate.
Another element of major importance in real estate transactions
is the relative experience of the parties involved. In Crockett, the
court attached considerable importance to the principle that courts will

not inquire into contractual obligations when parties are of equal competence.4 '

Mrs. Crockett and Domar Corporation may have been on

"equal footing" with defendant since each had engaged in some com-

mercial property dealings before. 42 But the situation may be quite dif-

ferent when a commercial lender is dealing with the typical residential
purchaser, 43 who is extremely naive in real estate transactions. Whether Crockett will be limited to its facts or will be extended to include
34. 289 N.C. at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
35. See, e.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190
(1971), cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972). Enforcement of an acceleration clause was denied on the ground that large prepayment penalties were involved.
Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
36. 289 N.C. at 625, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
37. Several commentators, however, point out that the due on sale clause inhibits alienation. See, e.g., Bonanno, Due-on-Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times of FluctuatingInterest Rates-Legal Issues and
Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 267, 309 (1972); Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due
on Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1109 (1975).
38. See Note, supra note 37, at 1113.
39. See Bonanno, supra note 37, at 309.
40. See Note, supra note 37, at 1113.
41. 289 N.C. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587. The court relied on Roberson v. Williams, 240 N.C. 696, 83 S.E.2d 811 (1954).
42. 289 N.C. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting Roberson v. Williams, 240 N.C.
696, 83 S.E.2d 811 (1954)).
43. See Justice Lake's dissenting opinion, 289 N.C. at 642-43, 224 S.E.2d at 59495.
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all real estate purchasers is a problem that the court must face in the
future.
,Although impairment of security is usually the most important policy factor in due on sale cases, the Crockett court did not mention any
of the considerations that enter the balancing process to determine
whether a lender's security has been impaired. The lender's security
often improves upon assumption of an existing note by a new debtor
because the lender now has two sources from whom to collect. The
new debtor becomes the principal obligor and the initial mortgagor becomes a surety.44 Another consideration in determining whether security is impaired is actual physical waste or depreciation of the mortgaged premises. 4" Perhaps the most controversial element of security
is the identity and personality of the borrower. Several courts have
recognized the lender's maintenance of control over the mortgagor's
identity and his financial responsibility as an acceptable business objective. 40 Security impairment is of major importance to both the courts
and the lenders. The court in Crockett, however, failed to analyze the
existence of that factor properly.
Because it rejected the traditional view of direct restraints in
Crockett, the North Carolina Supreme Court had to balance the policy
reasons underlying the restraints on alienation doctrine against the need
to protect both the economic vitality of secured transactions and the
freedom to contract.47 Enormous policy considerations support each
of these important legal concepts. In using a balancing test to determine the validity of the restriction, the court touched on several additional factors that support not only the due on sale clause, but the
whole real estate industry. The Crockett court described due on sale
clauses as conditions that promote alienability of property.48 Without'
the due on sale clause, a lender would be encouraged to explore alternatives that could, significantly reduce consumer access to the housing
44. See First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Page, 206 N.C. 18, 173 S.E.
312 (1934)..
45. See, e.g., Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d
1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
46. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d
1 (1975); Peoples Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus.; Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d
406 (1970).
47. See Comment, Mortgage Consent to Sale Clause: A Reasonable Restraint
on Alienation?, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 513, 529 (1975). These principles were
appropriately called "Giants of the Law."
48. 289 N.C. at 625, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
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market.49 Higher risks, which could be alleviated by use of the due on
sale clause, would force interest rates upward and make mortgage evaluation criteria much stricter. All of these factors point to a reduced supply
of mortgage money, which of course restricts alienability.
In his opinion, Justice Copeland noted several economic factors
that may be the real crux of Crockett. Sensible lenders use the due
on sale clause to minimize their risks.5 0 Use of the clause also permits
the lender to conform his loans to the current market rate. These
points can be explained by the economic history of the due on sale
clause. As one commentator suggested, the due on sale clause originally developed during times of stable interest rates as a device to
protect against bad credit risks.51 However, during the past few years,
home loan interest rates have become volatile. These increased rates
have put the savings lender in a different position:
The basic dilemma of the savings association business is an inability
to adjust earnings upward during periods of inflation accompanied
by rising interest rates ....52
Clearly, if a borrower 'were able to pass on to. a vendee the
borrower's low interest rate without interference by the lender, all
mortgages would continue at that rate until their original maturity
date. The effect of this increased payoff time over the current
average actual payoff time of eight to ten years would be to freeze
a lender's income at unprofitable levels for twenty to thirty years.5 3
Lenders who do not rely on depositors for their funds, such as commercial banks, real estate investment trusts and mortgage companies,
are not faced with the same dilemma. However, all lending institutions
rely to a great degree on the secondary mortgage market.
These economic considerations are especially important in North
Carolina. The two largest investors in the secondary market are the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Corporation (FHLBC). Each of these institutions'
uniform loan documents contain the due on sale clause. 4 Therefore,
49. See Comment, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance Clauses in California,
7 Loy. L.A. L REv. 306, 323 (1974).
50. 289 N.C. at 627, 224 S.E.2d at 585. See also Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
51. Comment, Use of "Due on" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A Common
Sense Defense, 10 Tusk L.J. 590, 610 (1975).
52. Id. at 592. See also UNrrED STATES LUAGur OF SAVINGS & LOAN Ass'Ns,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON SAVINGS ASS'N NEEDS, 1970.
53. Comment, supra note 51, at 592.
54. Brief for North Carolina Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at 9,
Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
The uniform documents allow the lender to refuse consent to the transfer if the
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as a matter of economic policy, Crockett is good for North Carolina.
If the court had overturned the due on sale clause or construed it strict-

ly, the two largest investors in the mortgage industry might have hesitated to buy North Carolina residential loans in the future. 5
In addition to the economic factors mentioned by the court, the
significant economic impact of the due on sale clause on both interest
rates and credit availability is also an important consideration. During
the last decade, this nation has witnessed a sharp rise in consumerism."
One area of attack by the "consumerists" has been the high interest rates
charged by lending institutions.

If lenders were precluded from using

the due on sale clause, it would be necessary to charge a higher interest
rate initially as a possible hedge against the loan continuing for a longer
period of time than normal.5 7 One result of Crockett is that the due
on sale clause becomes a safety valve for both lender and borrower.
The lender's liquidity is improved and his loan portfolio is kept close
to the current rates, which in turn forces down the rate available to
consumers.5
Several alternatives to adjust rates do exist that the court could
have proposed for future use by North Carolina lenders. The first of
these is the variable interest rate mortgage. One writer suggests that us-

age of these loans will render the interest rate an insignificant factor
in the price of property. 59 Nevertheless, variable rates may not be the
answer for North Carolina. Another financing scheme that could be
used is the short term loan with a negotiable rate. However, short term

loans may be against the public interest since the borrower's monthly
payments are increased and he may have to refinance several times." °
As the shortcomings of the feasible alternatives indicate, the due
proposed purchaser and interest rate are not acceptable. Telephone interview with
Gus Gesell, President of the Home Savings and Loan Association in Chapel Hill,
North Carolina (Sept. 9, 1976).
55. See Brief for North Carolina Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at
8, Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
56. See generally Symposium-Consumer Protection, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447
(1974).
57. See Comment, supra note 51, at 594.
58. See Bonnano, supra note 37, at 809.
59. Brief for North Carolina Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at 8,
Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580. The brief
states that Federal Home Loan Bank Board Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-1, .6-3,
6.14 (1976), prohibit federal savings and loan companies from using variable interest
rate loans while allowing state savings and loan companies to use them. These regulations would eliminate a large number of lenders in North Carolina.
60. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 (1970). See also Comment, Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n: "Due-on"
Clause Held as Restraint on Alienation, 7 U.W.L.A. L. Rav. 258, 265 (1975).
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on sale clause is the best economic alternative that the court could have
approved. Lenders prefer the clause as a protective device. Although
one writer has s~iggested that the personal credit of a person is irrelevant to the lender for security purposes,6 1 the lender is much more secure with a financially responsible person in possession. This ability
to determine who will be in possession affords much better protection
to the lender than a later foreclosure on a bad risk he was forced to
accept. Another added protection provided by the due on sale clause
is the lender's ability to maintain his current loan portfolio at a higher
rate of interest. A more current portfolio increases len"ding and stimulates economic activity. Of course these added protections are in turn
passed on to the borrower. Due on sale clauses allow borrowers to
receive a lower rate, 62 longer terms on the mortgage contract 3 and
more readily available mortgage credit.6 4 Crockett was indeed an
economic victory for both the lenders and borrowers of North Carolina.
Crockett, although a success economicdlly, may have its shortcomings as a practical standard for the public to follow. "Much of the
language used in the opinion points to application of the reasonable
circumstances view of the due onsale clause. However, little discussion
of the factors that usually go into this balancing analysis was made. A
possible result of this inadequate discussion may be confusion in the
lending market. A lender who reads Crockett as adopting the per se
approach 5 may want to accelerate at any time to reach the current interest rate obtainable in the market. Every possible transfer in North
Carolina would be subject to the unlimited scrutiny of the lender.
These transfers could occur not only by inter vivos conveyances, but
also by intestacy, testamentary devise, survivorship or even declaration
of trust. 66 If the lender has an unrestrained power of consent to any
possible transfer, then a virtual life and death control over the property
67
exists.
On the other hand, a borrower who reads the decision as adopting
61. See Bonanno, supra note 37, at 289-90.
62. See Comment, supra note 51, at 594.
63. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 (1973).
64. See Comment, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance Clauses in California,
7 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 306 (1974).
65. Mr. Justice Lake suggests this approach in his dissent. 289 N.C. at 638,
224 S.E.2d at 592.
66. See Bonanno, supra note 37, at 290.
67. See Comment,.Mortgages-a Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity
in the Enforcement of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. Rav. 485, 501
& n.71 (1973).
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the reasonable circumstances view has no effective guidelines to follow.
Will lenders be forced to divulge their trade secrets and give reasons
to support their conclusions of who is or is not a bad credit risk? The
definition of the creditworthy borrower-along with several other unresolved issues-will have to be answered in the future.0 8
Although a judicial landmark, Crockett will need future expansion.
Nevertheless Crockett has laid a good foundation for adoption of the
reasonable circumstances view in North Carolina.0 9 The task for the
courts is to build on this foundation and develop clear practical guidelines for all to follow. This task will be brought to the forefront soon,
for the reasonable circumstances view of the due on sale clause will
promote more litigation than either the per se approach or the impaired
70
security view.
Despite its unclear analysis and limited discussion of important
factors, Crockett was a good result for North Carolina. Instead of involving itself in the traditional approach of restraint on alienation and
merely dismissing the due on sale clause as a restraint, the court was
able to recognize the significant economic policies involved in the case.
Use of due on sale clauses encourages available mortgage credit, facilitates land ownership and, as a result, stimulates the alienation of property. Each of these effects is a needed and desirable stimulant for
our economy. Although Crockett may well have damaged the traditional view of restraints on alienation, it did not destroy the doctrine.
The court's awareness of the economic credit society in which we live
and of the great effect lending institutions have on the public was the
true basis for Crockett. Future North Carolina cases involving supposed restraints that do not carry these economic and public overtones
will probably be decided under the traditional view of restraints.
WILLIAM ROBERT CHERRY, JR.
68. Several other factors left unconsidered are as follows: (1) the guidelines
needed to measure the physical security impairment; (2) the borrowing class a certain
individual is in; (3) the important variables of the money market; (4) the evidence
needed to support a lender's decision regarding his loan portfolio; (5) whether the
portfolio decision and requested interest rate increase will be analyzed under an objective or subjective approach. The weight to be given to these factors will have to
be determined on a case-by-case basis. One court, however, has already suggested
that a case-by-case basis will lead to instability in land titles. See Baker v. Loves
Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
69. 289 N.C. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587. The court suggested that the circumstances of the case and the absence of other allegations supported the reasonable circumstances view.
70. See generally Note, supra note 11, at 336 & n.1.

